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Abstract 
Spider phobic individuals are characterized by exaggerated expectancies to be faced with 
spiders (so-called encounter expectancy bias). Whereas phobic responses have been linked to 
brain systems mediating fear, little is known about how the recruitment of these systems 
relates to exaggerated expectancies of threat. We used fMRI to examine spider phobic and 
control participants while they imagined visiting different locations in a forest after having 
received background information about the likelihood of encountering different animals 
(spiders, snakes, and birds) at these locations. Critically, imagined encounter expectancies 
modulated brain responses differently in phobics as compared with controls. Phobics 
displayed stronger negative modulation of activity in the lateral prefrontal cortex, precuneus, 
and visual cortex by encounter expectancies for spiders, relative to snakes or birds (within-
participants analysis); these effects were not seen in controls. Between-participants correlation 
analyses within the phobic group further corroborated the hypothesis that these phobia-
specific modulations may underlie irrationality in encounter expectancies (deviations of 
encounter expectancies from objective background information) in spider phobia; the greater 
the negative modulation a phobic participant displayed in the lateral prefrontal cortex, 
precuneus and visual cortex, the stronger was her bias in encounter expectancies for spiders. 
Interestingly, irrationality in expectancies reflected in frontal areas relied on right rather than 
left hemispheric deactivations. Our data accord with the idea that expectancy biases in spider 
phobia may reflect deficiencies in cognitive control and contextual integration that are 
mediated by right frontal and parietal areas.  
 
Keywords: spider phobia; fear; risk estimation; encounter expectancy bias; fMRI 
 
  
Expectancy bias 3 
 
Brain systems underlying encounter expectancy bias in spider phobia 
Spider phobia is frequent in the general population (lifetime prevalence: 11%; point 
prevalence: 3.5%; Fredrikson, Annas, Fischer, & Wik, 1996) and may have an evolutionary 
origin (Öhman & Mineka, 2001). However, while biological preparedness may be at the 
origin of animal phobia, not all of us are similarly frightened by actual or imagined 
encounters with fear-relevant animals such as spiders and snakes. This may be related to 
different expectancies regarding these potential sources of threat (e.g., Davey & Dixon, 1996).  
We (Aue & Hoeppli, 2012) have argued that elevated subjective expectancies of threat 
(regarding either the likelihood of an encounter with the feared animal, or the likelihood of 
incurring negative consequences from such encounters, or both) may increase an event’s 
salience and render threat-related information more readily available. Hence, biased (i.e., 
irrational) expectancies in phobia may be causally related to some of the observed biases in 
attention and memory (e.g., Mogg & Bradley, 2006; Olatunji, Sawchuk, Lee, Lohr, & Tolin, 
2008; Watts, McKenna, Sharrock, & Trezise, 1986; see Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, 
Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendorn, 2007, and Mitte, 2008, for meta-analytic data). 
Important insight into the mechanisms underlying expectancy bias in spider phobia can be 
gained by studying this phenomenon with brain imaging techniques.1 Yet, the majority of 
neurocognitive studies on spider phobic or spider fearful individuals have focused on 
particularities in perceptual/attentional and memory processes, while overlooking 
particularities in subjective expectations with respect to spiders.  
Standard presentation paradigms, in which phobic or fearful individuals watched 
pictures or films—without simultaneous assessment of expectancies—showed that spider 
phobia correlates with enhanced activity of the fear circuit (e.g., Davis & Lang, 2003; 
LeDoux, 1996) and with reduced activity in emotion regulation networks (e.g., Carlsson et al., 
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2004; Hermann et al., 2009), including regions such as the insula, medial prefrontal cortex 
(mPFC), and lateral prefrontal cortex (lPFC).  
Carlsson et al. (2004), for instance, found that conscious perception of animal phobia-
related pictures led to selective activation in the amygdala, anterior insula, medial 
orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and periaqueductal gray (see 
also Dilger et al., 2003; Rauch et al., 1995), activations that were not seen for evolutionary 
fear-relevant but non-phobogenic animals. At the same time, activity was reduced in both the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) and the right lateral OFC, when phobogenic trials were 
contrasted with fear-relevant trials. Together, these changes have been suggested to signal 
increased activation of the fear circuit and defective top-down control for phobia-related 
stimulus material.  
Somewhat contradictory to these findings, though, are those of an fMRI study by 
Paquette et al. (2003), which revealed activation in the right dlPFC when spider phobics 
viewed film excerpts depicting spiders (cf. Schienle, Schäfer, Walter, Stark, & Vaitl, 2005), 
which the authors attributed to the use of metacognitive strategies for the regulation of fear, 
possibly mediating avoidance behavior. After completion of cognitive behavior therapy, no 
such activation was found (for further changes associated with cognitive behavior therapy of 
spider phobia, see Schienle, Schäfer, Hermann, Rohrmann, & Vaitl, 2007). To solve the 
discrepancy regarding the dlPFC activations in animal phobia, it has been proposed that both 
non-phobics and phobics use top-down control, but perhaps of different kinds or with 
different effectiveness.  
In sum, some caution is warranted because prefrontal activations are not reliably 
observed across different studies (see Etkin & Wager, 2007). It is noteworthy as well that 
several earlier studies did not reveal any difference in amygdala activity even between 
phobia-related and neutral stimulus material (e.g., Fredrikson et al., 1993; Paquette et al., 
2003; Wik et al., 1993). Dilger et al. (2003) argue that this may be due to either limited 
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temporal resolution of PET or the use of block designs. Nevertheless, a consistent emerging 
picture is that individuals with animal phobia generally exhibit hyperactivation of the 
subcortical fear circuits, associated with various anomalies (most often a decrease) in the 
recruitment of control systems when confronted with phobia-relevant cues. However, more 
research is clearly required to clarify which components in these neural networks are more 
specifically related to particularities in subjective expectancies. Parts of the phobia-specific 
brain responses that reappear across diverse studies that use different experimental paradigms 
may indicate deviated expectancy processes. Identification of commonalities across studies 
and the link between these (de)activations and phobogenic expectancies may be helpful in the 
identification of situations that characterize irrationality in expectancies; a discovery that 
could have far-reaching implications for therapeutic applications. 
The current study’s focus, thus, is on the encounter expectancy bias in spider phobia, 
that is, the tendency to overestimate the likelihood of encountering spiders across a variety of 
situations (Aue & Hoeppli, 2012; de Jong & Muris, 2002). Two earlier brain imaging studies 
are noteworthy in this context. In a PET study by Wik, Fredrikson, and Fischer (1996), animal 
phobics anticipated the appearance of spiders and snakes in neutral film clips (i.e., displayed 
an encounter expectancy bias), whereas the non-fearful controls did not. Simultaneously, the 
phobics displayed reduced primary visual cortex activity compared with the non-fearful 
controls, which was interpreted as a “neurophysiological correlate of avoidant anticipatory 
coping” (p. 267). Yet, it remains unclear whether reduced visual cortex activity really is a 
specific correlate of phobogenic expectancies or of other components of the fear response 
(e.g., subjective feeling state) because expectancies and brain activity were not directly related 
in this study. Similarly, the anticipation of the presentation of spiders in another study 
(Straube, Mentzel, & Miltner, 2007) did not allow for taking these different components 
apart.  
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In the present study, therefore, we put subjective expectancies and neural activations 
into direct relation and asked whether the animal phobics’ overestimation (i.e., irrationality) 
of the likelihood of encountering spiders relates to (a) overactivation of the fear circuit (with 
the amygdala as a key structure), (b) reduced self-regulation capacities, and/or (c) reduced 
visual attention. Spider phobics and control participants viewed pictures of spiders, snakes, 
and birds, and were simultaneously given background information suggesting a low, medium, 
or high likelihood of encounters with these animals. The participants were subsequently asked 
to provide an estimate regarding their own risk to encounter the animals in this context. Both 
fMRI and behavioral measures were acquired during the task in order to determine the neural 
processes (i.e., emotional brain systems) underlying the encounter expectancy bias (Aue & 
Hoeppli, 2012) in spider phobia.2  
Specifically, we investigated whether exaggerated encounter expectancies for spiders 
in spider phobics can be related to distinctive neural responding (i.e., neural responding that is 
absent for encounter expectancies regarding snakes and birds in spider phobics and for 
encounter expectancies regarding all animal categories in the control group). From the 
existing literature on threat perception, high encounter estimates for spiders in spider phobia 
might be predicted to be associated with high activity of the fear circuit (e.g., the amygdala). 
However, it is also conceivable that cognitive or emotion regulation deficits are at the origin 
of exaggerated expectancies in spider phobia. In the latter case, we would expect, among 
other effects, distinctive alterations in the recruitment of prefrontal areas (e.g., Carlsson et al., 
2004; Hermann et al., 2009). Finally, we tested whether, as suggested by work conducted by 
Wik and collaborators (1996), abnormal visual cortex activity would be a specific correlate of 
the encounter expectancy bias in spider phobia. 
Method 
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Participants  
In total, 36 individuals (all female, 18 spider phobics), aged between 19 and 44 years (M = 
25.8, SD = 5.79) took part in the study. One participant in the control group was excluded 
from all analyses because she reported to have misunderstood the task instructions. For 
further characteristics of the two groups of participants, refer to Aue and Hoeppli (2012). 
Stimuli 
Stimuli consisted of 30 pictures displaying spiders and 30 pictures displaying snakes, all taken 
from a recently created picture base (Dan-Glauser & Scherer, 2011). Spiders and snakes 
covered virtually the whole picture and were located on trees, in front of trees, or on the grass. 
Spider and snake pictures were matched for valence, t(58) = 0.08, ns (Ms = 3.1 and 3.1; SDs = 
0.94 and 0.95, respectively; scale range: 1 [very unpleasant] to 9 [very pleasant]) and for 
arousal ratings, t(58) = 0.03, ns (Ms = 6.1 and 6.1; SDs = 0.88 and 0.75, respectively; scale 
range: 1 [not arousing at all] to 9 [very arousing]), as assessed in an earlier study (Dan-
Glauser & Scherer, 2011). Thirty additional pictures displaying birds were collected from the 
Internet.  
Procedure 
Upon participants’ arrival at the laboratory, written informed consent was obtained in 
accordance with the Helsinki Declaration of Human Rights (World Medical Association, 
1999) and regulations approved by the local ethics committee. Participants imagined they 
were visiting different locations in a forest, with the possibility of encountering different 
animals (spiders, snakes, or birds) at these locations. On each trial, background information 
was provided in the form of the frequency at which two forest officials had encountered one 
of these animals at the depicted location.  Participants then had to form and provide their own 
encounter expectancy, followed by an intensity rating for the fear they would experience in 
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case of such an encounter. The detailed trial sequence is displayed in Figure 1 (see also Aue 
& Hoeppli, 2012). Responses were given by pressing two buttons on an MRI-compatible 
button box (HH-1×4-CR, Current Designs Inc., USA), which moved a slider in steps of 
6.25% across a horizontal scale on the screen (17-point scale; starting point in each trial: 50%; 
0% = no risk of encounter/no fear at all; 100% = absolute certainty of encounter/maximal 
fear). Visual stimuli were presented on a back projection screen inside the MRI scanner bore 
with an LCD projector (CP-SX1350, Hitachi, Japan).    
FMRI data acquisition and image processing 
Transverse T2
*-weighted echo-planar images (EPIs) were acquired with a 3T scanner (Trio 
TIM, Siemens, Germany) using the product 12 channel head coil. Participants wore earplugs 
to attenuate scanner noise; head movement was restricted by a vacuum pillow.  
Structural images were acquired with a T1-weighted 3D sequence (MPRAGE, 
TR/TI/TE = 1900/900/2.27 ms, flip angle = 9 degrees, PAT factor = 2, voxel dimensions: 1 
mm isotropic, 256  256  192 voxels). Functional images were acquired with a 
susceptibility-weighted EPI sequence (TR/TE = 2000/30 ms, flip angle = 80 degrees, PAT 
factor = 2, 64  64 pixel, 3.2  3.2 mm, 36 slices, 3.2 mm slice thickness, 20% slice gap). An 
automatic shimming procedure was performed to minimize inhomogeneities of the static 
magnetic field. At the beginning of each session, image acquisition started after the recording 
of three dummy volumes to avoid T1 saturation effects.  
MRI data were pre-processed and analyzed using SPM8 (Wellcome Dept. of Imaging 
Neuroscience, London, UK; http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Functional images were 
spatially realigned to the first volume by rigid body transformation, corrected for time 
differences in slice acquisition by using the middle slice in time as reference, spatially 
normalized to the standard Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) EPI template to permit 
Expectancy bias 9 
 
group analysis, resampled to an isotropic voxel size of 3 mm, and spatially smoothed with an 
isotropic 8-mm full-width at half-maximum (FWHM) Gaussian kernel (Friston et al., 1995). 
FMRI analysis  
We performed standard analyses using the general linear model (GLM) as implemented in 
SPM8, where event-related signal changes were modeled separately for each participant. For 
each block of the experimental task, we specified a linear model that included 10 event types, 
corresponding to each picture onset and subsequent rating periods (Figure 2). The length of 
the first four events was set to 0 (scene and animal pictures) because the perceptual processes 
that are supposed to happen during these events have a clear onset. The length of the six 
events belonging to rating periods, in contrast, was set to 4 s, because the processes expected 
to happen in these periods do not have obvious onsets (when exactly do participants come to a 
conclusive decision that they express in their ratings?).  
For the encounter expectancy rating events, we added three parametric modulators 
(one for each animal) that described the modulation of the hemodynamic response in the 
expectancy rating phase by the subjective expectancy of encountering the animal (encounter 
expectancy estimate, as indicated in the behavioral response). In the parametric design in 
SPM, different levels of the expectancy ratings are represented numerically within one extra 
column (within each participant). Thus, in the expectancy rating phase, each participant had 
two predictors for each animal condition (see Figure 2): an overall effect for animal and, in 
addition, the parametric modulator that described the modulation of the magnitude of the 
hemodynamic response within each animal category by the expectancy rating score as 
exhibited in the participant’s behavioral data. (We also analyzed parametric modulations for 
the animal picture presentation phase to test whether neural activity during picture viewing 
was able to predict phobia-specific variations in encounter expectancies. However, because 
we did not find any significant effect in these analyses, they are not described here.) 
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A constant covariate representing the session-specific mean over scans, as well as six 
motion correction parameters extracted from the realignment procedure, were also added. The 
model included a high-pass filter of 128 s to remove low-frequency drift of the scanner and 
first-order auto-regressive corrections for auto-correlation between scans. Effects at each 
brain voxel were estimated by using a least squares algorithm.  
Data were analyzed in two steps. First, we investigated neural responses upon initial 
viewing of the animals (animal picture onset) in order to situate our own findings with respect 
to the existing literature (Step 1; data quality check). Second, and most important, we 
investigated our major research question, namely, how neural responses relate to irrational 
subjective expectancies of encounters with spiders in spider phobics (Step 2). Data modeling 
and analyses related to these two steps were conducted as follows. 
 
Step 1: Neural responses upon initial viewing of the animals (data quality check).  
To allow the comparison of our own findings with earlier studies, we performed a whole-
brain analysis in which we contrasted responses to spiders versus snakes during the 
presentation of the pictures (animal presentation phase) in phobics versus controls. By doing 
this, we identified particularities of spider phobics’ initial perceptual responses toward spiders 
(relative to fear-relevant but non-phobogenic animals): These responses should neither be 
seen for snakes in this group, nor should they appear in controls. In order to avoid alpha 
inflation and to save space (for statistically determined critical cluster sizes, see Step 2), we 
only report significant clusters containing at least 30 contiguous voxels at a p < .001 
(uncorrected). All parametric maps were rendered on sections of the average T1-weighted 
template brain of all participants.  
 
Step 2: Neural responses related to phobia-specific expectancies.  
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Modulation of neural activity during expectancy rating phase as a function of subjective 
likelihood of encounter 
Whole-brain analysis  
With Step 2, we investigated our major research question, namely, whether irrational 
expectancies regarding spider encounters in spider phobics are characterized by specific 
neural signatures. As outlined in the introduction, spider phobics have been found to exhibit 
distinctive subjective expectancies concerning the likelihood of encountering spiders (Aue & 
Hoeppli, 2012; de Jong & Muris, 2002). Consequently, we predicted the existence of brain 
areas whose activity displays selective modulation by subjective encounter expectancies for 
spiders in spider phobics; these modulations should not be a characteristic of “normal” 
variations in expectancies (e.g., encounter expectancies for snakes in spider phobics or 
encounter expectancies for spiders in controls). 
To investigate the neural correlates of subjective expectancies in spider phobia, 
therefore, we compared the parametric modulations of brain activity during the expectancy 
rating phase as a function of encounter likelihood reported (behavior rating) for spiders versus 
snakes (modSP-modSN) in each phobic and control participant. Subsequently, we calculated a 
second-level t test to identify areas displaying group differences regarding this parametric 
modulation contrast performed within each participant.   
In order to test whether activity in the identified clusters displays phobia-specific 
expectancy modulations (rather than stemming from particularities in phobia-unspecific 
modulations, e.g., concerning the control groups’ responses to snakes), we extracted the 
contrast estimates regarding the parametric modulations for spiders, snakes, and birds for each 
participant (averaged across all voxels constituting a cluster) and subjected them to an 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the factors Animal (spider, snake, bird) and Group 
(phobic, control). The existence of phobia-specific modulations was demonstrated by 
significant Group × Animal interactions, followed by post hoc Tukey tests demonstrating that 
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it was really the spider phobics’ modulator for spiders that made up the effect (i.e., differed 
from the other parametric modulators).  
In order to avoid alpha inflation, we only report significant clusters containing at least 
19 contiguous voxels at p < .005. This critical cluster size was calculated by a Monte Carlo 
simulation with 10,000 iterations, assuming some interdependence between voxels (8-mm 
FWHM), resulting in a corrected whole-brain p-value of .05. The application of such 
comparably liberal alpha thresholds at the voxel level and the whole-brain level seems to be 
appropriate in the investigation of the subtle affective/cognitive processes with imprecise 
temporal dynamics that we study here (e.g., in order to avoid massive beta error inflation; see 
Lieberman & Cunningham, 2009, for a detailed description on how to balance Type I and 
Type II errors in cognitive neuroscience). Notably, these alpha levels were actually applied to 
a double statistical test (i.e., contrast on a previously determined linear parametric 
relationship). All parametric maps were rendered on sections of the average T1-weighted 
template brain of all participants. 
Region of interest (ROI) analysis  
The whole-brain approach for the expectancy-related parametric modulations was 
complemented by an ROI analysis for left and right amygdala. We determined these ROIs 
according to the automated anatomical labeling approach of activations (Tzourio-Mazoyer et 
al., 2002) by using the MarsBaR ROI toolbox for SPM (Brett, Anton, Valabregue, & Poline, 
2002). ROIs were applied as masks to the model specified for the whole-brain analysis. 
Contrast estimates for these ROIs were then extracted and subjected to an ANOVA with the 
factors Animal (spider, snake, bird) and Group (phobic, control). 
 
Link between degree of phobia-specific modulation of brain activity by subjective expectancy 
level and magnitude of encounter expectancy bias displayed 
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Whereas the aforementioned analyses allowed the identification of phobia-specific 
expectancy modulations in brain activity, they did not yield any conclusion as to whether 
these modulations were directly implicated in the degree of irrationality (i.e., overestimation) 
displayed. This is because high expectancies of encounters were usually associated with 
background information suggesting a high likelihood of an encounter. Therefore, the first 
analysis did not allow us to conclude whether the presented results were related to bias (i.e., 
irrationality) or simply to high fear.  
We hypothesized that the selective modulation of brain activity by encounter 
expectancies for phobogenic material was directly related to the degree of expectancy bias 
displayed (i.e., the magnitude of a phobic participant’s irrationality or overestimation of 
encounter expectancies for spiders with respect to the objective background information 
given) in at least some of the areas identified earlier. To test this hypothesis, we adopted a 
between-participants approach and correlated phobia-specific expectancy-related modulations 
in the areas identified in the whole-brain analysis (i.e., contrast estimates for the parametric 
modulations) with the magnitude of individual expectancy bias (i.e., the degree of 
overestimation of encounter likelihood for spiders revealed in the behavior) within each group 
of participants.3  
Specifically, for each individual, the mean encounter expectancy rating for snakes was 
subtracted from the mean encounter expectancy rating for spiders (indexing the specific 
expectancy bias for spiders). We then calculated between-participants Pearson product-
moment correlation coefficients for the association between this behavioral expectancy bias, 
on the one hand, and the expectancy modulation effects revealed in brain activity (as 
identified in the whole-brain analysis described earlier), on the other hand, in both spider 
phobics and controls. Again, responses to snakes were included as a reference category to 
ensure that observed effects were phobia-specific. Identified correlations were tested for 
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significance and additionally transformed into Fisher’s Z values and tested for group 
differences (p < .05, one-tailed).  
 
Results 
Behavioral data 
 Fear and encounter expectancy ratings. Figure 3 displays the participants’ fear 
(manipulation check) and encounter expectancy ratings. Spider phobic and control 
participants both displayed fear in response to evolutionary threat (spiders and snakes) but not 
to birds. In addition, spider phobics reported significantly greater fear during the spider trials 
than during snake and bird trials, and also greater fear during the spider trials than did the 
control group. (The 2 (Group) × 3 (Animal) ANOVA conducted on the fear ratings showed a 
main effect for Group, F(1, 33) = 19.59, p < .001, a main effect for Animal, F(2, 66) = 
151.17, p < .001, and a significant interaction of Group and Animal, F(2, 66) = 46.41, p < 
.001). 
Moreover, spider phobics were characterized by a significant expectancy bias for 
encounters with spiders. Despite the same background information being presented (objective 
probability), they estimated the risk of encountering spiders to be much higher than the risk of 
encountering snakes and birds. In controls, no such bias was observed. (The 2 (Group) × 3 
(Animal) ANOVA conducted on the expectancy ratings showed no main effect for Group, 
F(1, 33) = 0.43, ns, a main effect for Animal, F(2, 66) = 9.78, p < .0005, and a significant 
interaction of Group and Animal, F(2, 66) = 7.06, p < .005.) More detailed descriptions and 
discussions of the behavioral data in this study can be found elsewhere (Aue & Hoeppli, 
2012). 
MRI data  
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 Neural responses upon initial viewing of the animals (data quality check). To compare 
our own findings with those of earlier studies, we performed a whole-brain analysis in which 
we contrasted responses to spiders versus snakes during the presentation of the pictures 
(animal presentation phase) in phobics versus controls. Figure 4 shows the brain regions 
exhibiting group differences in activity for the contrast “spider versus snake” during the 
animal picture presentation phase. Separate analyses for phobics and controls revealed that 
increased activation in response to spiders in these areas was limited to the phobic group; 
controls exhibited no differential responses to the two animal categories.  
Enhanced activity in spider phobics spanned almost the whole brain, including in 
particular the amygdala, visual cortices, thalamus, insula, medial and lateral prefrontal areas, 
and both dorsal and ventral striatum. The contrast “spider versus bird” produced almost 
identical results (not described here; see Supplementary Figure 1 for activation clusters). 
Finally, the contrast “snake versus bird” did not reveal any group differences in the animal 
presentation phase. Together, these data confirm a selective and robust recruitment of the fear 
networks in response to spider stimuli in spider phobics, and thus clearly validate the 
reliability of our paradigm and our population selection. 
 
 Neural responses related to phobia-specific expectancies. 
Modulation of neural activity during expectancy rating phase as a function of subjective 
likelihood of encounter 
Whole-brain analysis  
We predicted the existence of brain areas that display selective modulation by subjective 
encounter expectancies for spiders in spider phobics, modulations that should not be a 
characteristic of “normal” variations in expectancies (e.g., encounter expectancies for snakes 
in spider phobics or encounter expectancies for spiders in controls). The comparison of the 
parametric expectancy effect between the two fear-relevant categories (modSP vs. modSN) 
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revealed nine clusters showing differential modulation for spider phobics versus controls 
(whole-brain analysis; Figure 5; Table 1). These were located in the precuneus, lPFC (right: 
dlPFC; left: both ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and dlPFC), occipital cortex, and 
premotor cortex (PMC)/supplementary motor area (SMA). Separate analyses for each group 
revealed that these effects could be fully attributed to the differential response of phobics to 
spiders versus snakes, whereas there was no difference in controls.  
To ensure that these effects were related to particularities in spider phobics’ encounter 
expectancies for spiders (rather than snakes), we also extracted the parameter estimates from 
these nine clusters obtained with the parametric analysis (corresponding to the slope of the 
modulatory effect), and then calculated an ANOVA with the factors Animal (spider, snake, 
bird) and Group (phobic, control) for each region. All analyses revealed a significant 
interaction of Animal and Group (Table 2, top). Post hoc Tukey tests demonstrated that the 
effects indeed mainly reflected a selective modulation by expectancy level for spiders in 
spider phobics (see Figure 6 for an exemplary pattern in the precuneus [first cluster specified 
in Tables 1 and 2]; Supplementary Figure 2 displays modulation patterns for all clusters 
obtained). Only in the left lPFC and the left PMC/SMA did expectancy effects arise because 
of particular modulations for spiders and for snakes in spider phobics. Again, there was no 
effect in controls.  
 Remarkably, across all clusters, the effects observed in phobics involved a negative 
relationship between neural activity during expectancy rating and actual expectancy level—a 
relationship that was unique for spider trials (i.e., no such effect was seen for snakes or birds 
in this group). In other words, the higher the phobics estimated the risk to encounter a spider, 
the greater the reduction (or the smaller the increase) in activity they displayed in the 
precuneus, lPFC, occipital cortex, and PMC/SMA.4 Activity in the left (but not in the right) 
lPFC and in the left (but not in the right) PMC/SMA showed an additional positive 
relationship with expectancy level for snakes in spider phobics.  
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ROI analysis 
Modulation parameters were also extracted from the left and right amygdala and subjected to 
an ANOVA with the factors Animal (spider, snake, bird) and Group (phobic, control). The 
critical interactions Animal × Group failed to reach significance (Table 2, bottom), indicating 
that differences in encounter expectancy levels were not predicted by the magnitude of 
amygdala activation.  
 
Link between degree of phobia-specific modulation of brain activity by subjective expectancy 
level and magnitude of encounter expectancy bias displayed 
We further predicted the selective modulation of brain activity by encounter expectancies for 
phobogenic material to be directly related to the degree of expectancy bias (i.e., irrationality) 
displayed in at least some of the areas identified earlier. Table 3 shows the between-
participants Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients between the degree of 
parametric modulation of brain activity by expectancy ratings, on the one hand, and the 
magnitude of the expectancy bias for spiders relative to snakes, on the other hand. 
Specifically, these correlations were calculated between the parametric estimates (i.e., slope) 
extracted from each of the nine clusters that were modulated by expectancy ratings, on the 
one hand, and the overall encounter expectancy rating difference (spider vs. snake), on the 
other hand. All clusters located in the precuneus exhibited a strong relationship with the 
individual expectancy bias, suggesting a key implication of this structure in phobia-specific 
deviations of subjective expectancies. In addition, both the right dlPFC and the occipital 
cortex revealed the same pattern as the precuneus clusters. 
Discussion 
Neural responses upon initial viewing of the animals (data quality check) 
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To situate our own findings with respect to those of earlier studies, we performed a whole-
brain analysis in which we contrasted responses to spiders versus snakes during the 
presentation of the pictures (animal presentation phase) in phobics versus controls. Phobics 
displayed massively increased activity in many brain areas, including the classic fear circuit 
(e.g., Davis & Lang, 2003), emotion regulation systems (e.g., Carlsson et al., 2004; Hermann 
et al., 2009), and attentional networks (e.g., Pourtois, Schwartz, Seghier, Lazeyras, & 
Vuilleumier, 2006), when they were shown pictures of spiders rather than snakes or birds. 
This pattern constitutes a substantial arousal response and reflects the significant emotional 
impact of spider stimuli on these participants. Consistent with earlier research (Carlsson et al., 
2004; Paquette et al., 2003; Rauch et al., 1995; Schienle et al., 2007; Straube, Mentzel, & 
Miltner, 2006; Straube et al., 2007), we found phobic responses to be characterized by 
increased activity in the amygdala, insula, mOFC, ACC, and midbrain. However, contrary to 
some earlier findings (e.g., Carlsson et al., 2004; Fredrikson, Wik, Annas, Ericson, & 
Stoneelander, 1995; Fredrikson et al., 1993), we did not observe decreases in the lateral OFC, 
dlPFC, posterior cingulate cortex, and hippocampus.  
These findings of increased rather than decreased activity in the regulation network 
comprising the lateral OFC and dlPFC are consistent with Paquette et al.’s (2003) 
observations and with their proposal that phobics attempt to regulate their exaggerated 
responses to spiders but apply ineffective strategies. Alternatively, the divergent effects 
reported for the lPFC areas between studies might be a result of experimental manipulation 
differences. For example, Carlsson et al.’s (2004) participants only looked at animal pictures, 
whereas our participants simultaneously received background information about the general 
risk of encountering the animal presented and had the task to subsequently indicate their 
personal encounter expectancy estimation. Generally, our participants mentioned having tried 
to take into account the background information presented; however, when spiders were 
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presented, this may have demanded greater processing resources because of the concomitant 
influence of other (e.g. fear-related) processes in the phobics. 
Somewhat surprisingly, neural activity in the animal picture presentation phase did not 
affect phobia-specific variations in encounter expectancies as expressed in the subsequent 
expectancy rating phase (for the specific kind of analysis performed, see fMRI analysis in the 
Method section). This suggests that our participants’ encounter expectancies were shaped 
independently from their initial response to the pictures displayed. The visual material 
presented may have prioritized perceptual processing over the processing of expectancies. It is 
very likely that our participants were able to profoundly process expectancy-related 
information only when the pictures had finally reduced in size (covering about 1/8 of the 
screen) and the corresponding rating scale was displayed.  
 
Neural responses related to phobia-specific expectancies 
Our major research question asked whether irrational expectancies regarding spider 
encounters in spider phobics were characterized by specific neural signatures. In the current 
study, neural responses during the expectancy rating phase that varied as a function of the 
imagined expectancies of encountering a phobogenic object (i.e., a spider) included 
distinctive activity in the precuneus, lPFC, and primary visual cortex. The higher the phobic 
participants estimated the risk of encountering a spider, the lower the activity in these areas. 
Importantly, these relationships were not observed in the control group, nor were they seen 
for snakes or birds in the phobic group. In addition, the negative modulations in the 
precuneus, right dlPFC, and right primary visual cortex were direct indicators of the 
magnitude of phobic expectancy bias (i.e., the tendency to overestimate the encounter 
likelihood for spiders relative to the objective background information). Consequently, 
differential activation of these brain areas constituted a specific feature of phobic responding.  
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The regions we found to be related to phobia-specific expectancy modulations in the 
current study have been associated with emotion regulation in previous research (e.g., 
Cavanna & Trimble, 2006; see Carlsson et al., 2004; Hermann et al., 2009; Schienle et al., 
2007; Wik et al., 1996, for their implications in animal phobia). This suggests that biased 
expectancies in spider phobia are an important constituent of deficits in emotion regulation 
processes that are mediated by these areas. 
Activity in the dlPFC, for instance, has been linked to top-down control of lower level 
cognitive processes (e.g., Carlsson et al., 2004; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002) and proposed to 
be crucially implicated in the integration of existing knowledge, expectancies, and goals. A 
core feature of animal phobia is that phobics are aware that their subjective expectancies with 
respect to the phobic animal are exaggerated and do not correspond to objective risk 
indicators (as reflected in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders [4th ed., 
text rev.; American Psychiatric Association, 2000] and the International Classification of 
Diseases [10th rev.; World Health Organization, 1992]  criteria for specific phobia), thus 
demonstrating discordance between knowledge and expectancies. Higher encounter 
expectancies for spiders in phobics—implying a frequent experience of threat in the 
environment—may therefore be the result of a diminished capacity to activate critical neural 
integration centers.  
Consistent with such an interpretation, the precuneus—often in concert with prefrontal 
cortex activity—has been linked to phenomena such as reflective self-awareness (e.g., Kjaer, 
Nowak, & Lou, 2002), adoption of the third-person perspective (e.g., Vogeley et al., 2004), 
episodic memory retrieval or planning (e.g., Lundstrom, Ingvar, & Petersson, 2005), or self-
regulation (see Cavanna & Trimble, 2006, for an overview of functions associated with the 
precuneus). All of these phenomena strongly rely on contextual integration capacities. For this 
reason, the precuneus constitutes an important convergence zone whose functioning may be 
impeded in phobogenic situations. Impaired contextual processing of anticipated events and 
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background information due to reduced recruitment of the precuneus may account for 
unrealistic assessment of threat and encounter likelihood as seen in phobics.  
An alternative interpretation of these deviating activities in the dlPFC and precuneus 
in phobic expectancies consists of pathological memory (e.g., impaired memory for 
background information displayed; for evidence linking the dlPFC with memory processes, 
see, for instance, D’Esposito et al., 1995; for evidence linking the precuneus with memory 
processes, see, for instance, Lundstrom et al., 2005) rather than emotion regulation processes. 
Given the fact that most research findings on the neural correlates of animal phobia strengthen 
the idea of reduced regulation capacities (e.g., e.g., Carlsson et al., 2004; Hermann et al., 
2009), however, our primary interpretation of the data is consistent with the idea of 
deficiencies in cognitive control and associated integration processes. 
The diminished activation in the visual cortex of spider phobic participants, observed 
when the imagined risk of encountering spiders was high, might be part of an avoidance 
response aimed at coping with the situation (Aue, Hoeppli, Piguet, Sterpenich, & Vuilleumier, 
2013; Wik et al., 1996). Because of the inefficiency of coping strategies directed at reducing 
emotional responses in phobogenic situations, high expectancies of encounters with spiders 
may only be tolerated by reducing visual attention to the experimental situation. Alternatively, 
this result may have arisen because higher expectancy ratings implied the direction of visual 
attention to the right visual hemifield (therefore, reducing activity in the right primary visual 
cortex).  
Impressively, regarding hemispheric lateralization, our effects for encounter 
expectancy variations were quite symmetric (see Table 1 for details). However, whereas 
activity in left lPFC was diminished when phobic participants estimated the risk of 
encountering spiders as high (as in all other clusters displayed), it was not predictive of 
magnitude of expectancy bias (i.e., the deviations in subjective encounter expectancies from 
objective background information). Thus, this characteristic reduced activity of high 
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encounter expectancies appeared irrespective of the degree of irrationality in expectancies. A 
closer look at Table 3 reveals that frontal areas located in the right hemisphere generally 
exhibited a stronger association with biases in expectancies than did frontal areas located in 
the left hemisphere. Consequently, in addition to posterior midline structures, right rather than 
left frontal hemispheric deactivations may be a specific correlate of irrational encounter 
expectancies in spider phobia.  
Notably, we also analyzed parametric modulations for the animal picture presentation 
phase to test whether neural activity during picture viewing was able to predict phobia-
specific variations in encounter expectancies. However, we did not find any expectancy-
related activation during that phase. This is possibly because the imagination (and thus the 
expectations) of an encounter did not happen in, or at least was not restricted to, the animal 
picture presentation period. Instead, in our task, participants first needed to perceive the 
animal being presented and to fully process the corresponding background information. They 
were only then able to integrate this information and subsequently form a personal encounter 
expectancy. Thus, an expectancy bias should not have arisen instantaneously. It is likely that a 
complete integration of the information being given happened only in the later expectancy 
rating phase. This is the moment when participants were prompted to make a conclusive 
statement about their personal expectation. Therefore, it is not surprising that the behavioral 
rating (which presents this final outcome expectancy) correlates best with brain activity in the 
expectancy rating phase.  
In addition, phobic individuals often have problems withdrawing attention from 
phobia-relevant pictures (e.g., Gerdes, Alpers, & Pauli, 2008), and/or avoiding the phobic 
triggers being presented (e.g., Rinck & Becker, 2006). In the current study, there was indeed 
some indication that our phobic participants withdrew their visual attention from the spider 
pictures approximately 2 s after stimulus onset (Aue, Hoeppli, Piguet, Sterpenich, & 
Vuilleumier, 2013). It is thus possible that they were able to perform the task (i.e., form their 
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personal encounter expectancies) only when the pictures had reduced in size and gave the 
impression of increasing distance.  
The findings in the current study demonstrate some significant differences with 
respect to earlier studies on spider phobia. Straube et al. (2007) reported spider phobics to 
display increased activity in the dorsal ACC, insula, thalamus, and bed nucleus of the stria 
terminalis during the anticipation of the presentation of spider pictures. Yet, none of these 
areas was associated with the encounter expectancy bias studied here. It is important to note, 
however, that anticipation in the Straube et al. study was characterized by certainty; whenever 
the phobics anticipated the apparition of spiders, there was a 100% likelihood that a spider 
would subsequently be shown. Therefore, expectancy-related processes may rely on different 
brain structures in certain versus uncertain situations.  
Carlsson et al. (2004) observed reduced activity in the right PFC in spider phobia and 
suggested that this could reflect the reallocation of processing resources in the service of 
urgent and immediate response preparation, the latter being mediated by subcortical structures 
of the fear circuit and orienting processes independent of lateral prefrontal areas. The 
recruitment of fear systems mediating immediate and direct pursuit of defense in the service 
of survival might therefore be predicted to inhibit or overrule slower and longer lasting 
processes that are implicated in the integration of existing knowledge, expectancies, and other 
goals. Here, however, we found no indication whatsoever that alterations in phobia-related 
encounter expectancies are associated with increased activity in the amygdala or other 
structures constituting the fear circuit (Davis & Lang, 2003). This might be explained by the 
fact that the amygdala evaluates the general salience of an event (Davis & Whalen, 2001; 
Kawashima et al., 1999; Wager, Phan, Liberzon, & Taylor, 2003), but is not (or is less) 
dependent on more fine-grained situational factors such as focus of attention (e.g., Straube et 
al., 2006; Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2001). In our case, the critical cues 
signaling general situational salience rather correspond to the presentation of spider images. 
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The viewing of the spider images may be seen as already constituting an encounter with 
potential threat and may have determined the appraisal of personal relevance. The additional 
imagination of different probability levels to encounter these animals may have produced 
modulations in amygdala activity that were too weak to be detectable. Alternative 
explanations for the absence of expectancy-related effects in the amygdala may be (a) that 
amygdala responses are primarily stimulus-driven and typically triggered by sensory cues 
rather than internal cognitive representations such as expectancies (see Vuilleumier, Armony, 
& Dolan, 2003); (b) that amygdala habituation occurs (e.g., Larson et al., 2006; note, 
however, that, in our study, amygdala activation during the earlier animal presentation phase 
did not predict subsequent expectancy ratings either); or (c) that amygdala responding is 
dampened because of active cognitive processes involved in making expectancy ratings.  
Finally, we might be criticized for the rather cognitive nature of our task. For instance, 
it could be argued that the performance of this type of task relied more strongly on controlled 
working memory processes than on the automatized processes one usually associates with 
encounter expectancy bias. Future research should develop innovative new experimental 
paradigms that make use of more intuitive, and more automatized, mental processes. Existent 
paradigms of this kind (e.g., de Jong & Muris, 2002) do not yet allow the determination of the 
degree of bias or irrationality displayed and also cannot reliably link phobia-specific fine-
grained trial-to-trial variations in expectancies with abnormal variations in neural activity. 
One advantage of our task over others in the field is therefore that it enabled the consideration 
of such fine-grained critical variations in expectancies. Moreover, the background information 
presented allowed the calculation of the objective likelihood of encountering different 
animals, and a participants’ encounter estimate could then be directly related to this objective 
likelihood, thus determining degree of irrationality. The inclusion of the objective background 
information further permitted us to keep the mean objective likelihood constant across the 
different animal categories.  
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In sum, our data accord with the idea that expectancy biases in spider phobia may 
reflect deficiencies in cognitive control and contextual integration that are mediated by right 
frontal and parietal areas. Therapeutic interventions should enable the acquisition of strategies 
that improve the phobics’ capacity to integrate different pieces of information during 
distressing anticipations of spider confrontations. In the ideal case, spider phobics would then 
be able to adequately process safety signals, thereby counteracting catastrophic thinking and 
thus successfully down-regulating their intense fear. 
  
Expectancy bias 26 
 
Author note 
This research was supported by grant PZ00P1_121590 of the Swiss National Science 
Foundation to Tatjana Aue.  
 
 
  
Expectancy bias 27 
 
References 
American Psychiatric Association (2000). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental 
disorders (4th ed., text rev.). Washington, DC: Author. 
Aue, T., & Hoeppli, M. E. (2012). Evidence for an encounter expectancy bias in fear of 
spiders. Cognition and Emotion, 26, 727–736. 
Aue T., Hoeppli, M. E., & Piguet, C. (2012). The sensitivity of physiological measures to 
phobic and nonphobic fear intensity. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 26, 
154–167. 
Aue T., Hoeppli, M. E., Piguet, C., Sterpenich, V., & Vuilleumier, P. (2013). Visual 
avoidance in phobia: Particularities in neural activity, autonomic responding, and 
cognitive risk evaluations. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7, 194. 
Aue, T., Lavelle, L. A., & Cacioppo, J. T. (2009). Great expectations: What can fMRI tell us 
about psychological phenomena? International Journal of Psychophysiology, 73, 10–
16. 
Bar-Haim, Y., Lamy, D., Pergamin, L., Bakermans-Kranenburg, M. J., & van IJzendorn, M. 
H. (2007). Threat-related attentional bias in anxious and nonanxious individuals: A 
meta-analytic study. Psychologial Bulletin, 133, 1–24. 
Brett, M., Anton, J. L., Valabregue, R., & Poline, J. B. (2002, June). Region of interest 
analysis using an SPM toolbox [Abstract]. Presented at the 8th International 
Conference on Functional Mapping of the Human Brain, June 2–6, 2002, Sendai, 
Japan. Available on CD-ROM in Neuroimage 16(2). 
Carlsson, K., Petersson, K. M., Lundqvist, D., Karlsson, Ingvar, M., & Öhman, A. (2004). 
Fear and the amygdala: Manipulation of awareness generates differential cerebral 
responses to phobic and fear-relevant (but nonfeared) stimuli. Emotion, 4, 340–353.  
Cavanna, A. E., & Trimble, M. R. (2006). The precuneus: A review of its functional anatomy 
and behavioural correlates. Brain, 129, 564–583. 
Expectancy bias 28 
 
Corbetta, M., & Shulman, G. L. (2002). Control of goal-directed and stimulus-driven 
attention in the brain. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 3, 201–215. 
Dan-Glauser, E. S., & Scherer, K. R. (2011). The Geneva Affective PicturE Database 
(GAPED): A new 730 picture database focusing on valence and normative 
significance. Behavior Research Methods, 43, 468–477. 
Davey, G. C. L., & Dixon, A. L. (1996). The expectancy bias model of selective associations: 
The relationship of judgements of CS dangerousness, CS–UCS similarity and prior 
fear to a priori and a posteriori covariation assessments. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 34, 235–252. 
Davis, M., & Lang, P. J. (2003). Emotion. In M. Gallagher & R. J. Nelson (Eds.), Handbook 
of psychology: Volume 3. Biological psychology (pp. 405–439). New York, NY: 
Wiley.  
Davis, M., & Whalen, P. J. (2001). The amygdala: Vigilance and emotion. Molecular 
Psychiatry, 6, 13–34. 
de Jong, P. J., & Muris, P. (2002). Spider phobia: Interaction of disgust and perceived 
likelihood of involuntary physical contact. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 16, 51–65.  
D’Esposito, M., Detre, J. A., Alsop, D. C., Shin, R. K., Atlas, S., & Grossman, M. (1995). 
The neural basis of the central executive system of working memory. Nature, 378, 
279–281. 
Dilger, S., Straube, T., Mentzel, H. J., Fitzek, C., Reichenbach, J. R., Hecht, H., . . . Miltner 
W. H. (2003). Brain activation to phobia-related pictures in spider phobic humans: An 
event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging study. Neuroscience Letters, 
348, 29–32. 
Etkin, A., & Wager, T. D. (2007). Functional neuroimaging of anxiety: A meta-analysis of 
emotional processing in PTSD, social anxiety disorder and specific phobia. American 
Journal of Psychiatry, 164, 1476–1488. 
Expectancy bias 29 
 
Fredrikson, M., Annas, P., Fischer, H., & Wik, G. (1996). Gender and age differences in the 
prevalence of specific fears and phobias. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 34, 33–39. 
Fredrikson, M., Wik, G., Annas, P., Ericson, K., & Stoneelander, S. (1995). Functional 
neuroanatomy of visually elicited simple phobic fear: Additional data and theoretical 
analysis. Psychophysiology, 32, 43–48. 
Fredrikson, M., Wik, G., Greitz, T., Eriksson, L., Stoneelander, S., Ericson, K., & Sedvall, G. 
(1993). Regional cerebral blood-flow during experimental phobic fear. 
Psychophysiology, 30, 126–130. 
Friston, K. J., Holmes, A. P., Worsley, K. J., Poline, J. B., Frith, C. D., & Frackowiak, R. S. J. 
(1995). Statistical parametric maps in functional imaging: A general linear approach. 
Human Brain Mapping, 2, 189–210. 
Gerdes, A. B. M., Alpers, G. W., & Pauli, P. (2008). When spiders appear suddenly: Spider-
phobic patients are distracted by task-irrelevant spiders. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 46, 174–187. 
Hermann, A., Schäfer, A., Walter, B., Stark, R., Vaitl, D., & Schienle, A. (2009). Emotion 
regulation in spider phobia: Role of the medial prefrontal cortex. Social Cognitive and 
Affective Neuroscience, 4, 257–267. 
Kawashima, R., Sugiura M., Kato, T., Nakamura, A., Hatano, K., Ito, K., . . . Nakamura, K. 
(1999). The human amygdala plays an important role in gaze monitoring: A PET 
study. Brain, 122, 779–783. 
Kjaer, T. W., Nowak, M., & Lou, H. C. (2002). Reflective self-awareness and conscious states: 
PET evidence for a common midline parietofrontal core. Neuroimage, 17, 1080–1086. 
Larson, C. L., Schaefer, H. S., Siegle, G. J., Jackson, C. A. B., Anderle, M. J., & Davidson, R. 
J. (2006). Fear is fast in phobic individuals: Amygdala activation in response to fear-
relevant stimuli. Biological Psychiatry, 60, 410–417. 
LeDoux, J. E. (Ed.). (1996). The emotional brain. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster. 
Expectancy bias 30 
 
Lieberman, M. D., & Cunningham, W. A. (2009). Type I and Type II error concerns in fMRI 
research: Re-balancing the scale. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 4, 423–
428. 
Lundstrom, B. N., Ingvar, M., & Petersson, K. M. (2005). The role of precuneus and left 
inferior frontal cortex during source memory episodic retrieval. Neuroimage, 27, 824–
834. 
Mitte, K. (2008). Memory bias for threatening information in anxiety and anxiety disorders: A 
meta-analytic review. Psychologial Bulletin, 134, 886–911. 
Mogg, K., & Bradley, B. P. (2006). Time course of attentional bias for fear-relevant pictures 
in spider-fearful individuals. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 44, 1241–1250. 
Öhman, A., & Mineka, S. (2001). Fears, phobias, and preparedness: Toward an evolved 
module of fear and fear learning. Psychological Review, 108, 483–522.  
Olatunji, B. O., Sawchuk, C. N., Lee, T., Lohr, J. M., & Tolin, D. F. (2008). Information 
processing biases in spider phobia: Application of the Stroop and "White" noise 
paradigm. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 39, 187–200. 
Paquette, V., Lévesque, J., Mensour, B., Leroux, J. M., Beaudoin, G., Bourgouin, P., & 
Beauregard, M. (2003). ‘Change the mind and you change the brain’: Effects of 
cognitive-behavioral therapy on the neural correlates of spider phobia. Neuroimage, 
18, 401–409. 
Pourtois, G., Schwartz, S., Seghier, M. L., Lazeyras, F., & Vuilleumier, P. (2006). Neural 
systems for orienting attention to the location of threat signals: An event-related fMRI 
study. Neuroimage, 31, 920–933. 
Rauch, S. L., Savage, C. R., Alpert, N. M., Miguel, E. C., Baer, L., Breiter, H. C., . . . Jenike, 
M. A. (1995). A positron emission tomographic study of simple phobic symptom 
provocation. Archives of General Psychiatry, 52, 20–28. 
Expectancy bias 31 
 
Rinck, M., & Becker, E. S. (2006). Spider fearful individuals attend to threat, then quickly 
avoid it: Evidence from eye movements. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 115, 231–
238. 
Schienle, A., Schäfer, A., Hermann, A., Rohrmann, S., & Vaitl, D. (2007). Symptom 
provocation and reduction in patients suffering from spider phobia. European Archives 
of Psychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences, 257, 486–493. 
Schienle, A., Schäfer, A., Walter, B., Stark, R., & Vaitl, D. (2005). Brain activation of spider 
phobics towards disorder-relevant, generally disgust- and fear-inducing pictures. 
Neuroscience Letters, 388, 1–6. 
Straube, T., Mentzel, H. J., & Miltner, W. H. (2006). Neural mechanisms of automatic and 
direct processing of phobogenic stimuli in specific phobia. Biological Psychiatry, 59, 
162–170. 
Straube, T., Mentzel, H. J., & Miltner, W. H. (2007). Waiting for spiders: Brain activation 
during anticipatory anxiety in spider phobics. Neuroimage, 37, 1427–1436. 
Tzourio-Mazoyer, N., Landeau, B., Papathanassiou, D., Crivello, F., Etard, O., Delcroix, N., . 
. . Joliot, M. (2002). Automated anatomical labeling of activations in SPM using a 
macroscopic anatomical parcellation of the MNI MRI single-subject brain. 
Neuroimage, 15, 273–289. 
Vogeley, K., May, M., Ritzl, A., Falkai, P., Zilles, K., & Fink, G. R. (2004). Neural correlates 
of first-person perspective as one constituent of human self-consciousness. Journal of 
Cognitive Neuroscience, 16, 817–827.  
Vuilleumier, P., Armony, J., & Dolan, J. (2003). Reciprocal links between emotion and 
attention. In R. S. J. Frackowiak et al. (Eds.), Human brain function (2nd ed., pp. 419–
444). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.  
Expectancy bias 32 
 
Vuilleumier, P., Armony, J. L., Driver, J., & Dolan, R. J. (2001). Effects of attention and 
emotion on face processing in the human brain: An event-related fMRI study. Neuron, 
30, 829–841. 
Wager, T., Phan, K. L., Liberzon, I., & Taylor, S. F. (2003). Valence, gender, and 
lateralization of functional brain anatomy in emotion: A meta-analysis of findings 
from neuroimaging. Neuroimage, 19, 513–531. 
Watts, F. N., McKenna, F. P., Sharrock, R., & Trezise, L. (1986). Colour naming of phobia-
related words. British Journal of Psychology, 77, 97–108. 
Wik, G., Fredrikson, M., Ericson, K., Eriksson, L., Stoneelander, S., & Greitz, T. (1993). A 
functional cerebral response to frightening visual stimulation. Psychiatry Research: 
Neuroimaging, 50, 15–24. 
Wik, G., Fredrikson, M., & Fischer, H. (1996). Cerebral correlates of anticipated fear: A PET 
study of specific phobia. International Journal of Neuroscience, 87, 267–276. 
World Health Organization. (1992). International classification of diseases and related health 
problems (10th rev.). Geneva, Switzerland: Author. 
World Medical Association. (1999). Proposed revision of the Declaration of Helsinki. British 
Medical Journal, 147, 18–22. 
  
Expectancy bias 33 
 
Footnotes 
1 See Aue, Lavelle, and Cacioppo (2009) for the utility of fMRI in the investigation of 
psychological phenomena. 
2 We also acquired peripheral nervous system activity. Effects unrelated to 
expectancies are presented elsewhere (Aue, Hoeppli, & Piguet, 2012). 
3 At first glance, one might consider using the deviation of subjective expectancies 
from the objective risk information as a parametric modulator of the brain response in the 
GLM model—similar to the procedure described previously for the absolute subjective 
expectancies. However, an important observation we made was that deviations in encounter 
expectancies for spiders in phobics were not independent from the objective risk of 
encountering them (see Aue & Hoeppli, 2012, for details). Specifically, our participants 
particularly overestimated the risk of encountering spiders when the given objective 
likelihood was low. Consequently, a within-participant parametric approach for deviations in 
expectancies might confound effects of the overall expectancy level versus the relative 
expectancy deviation because high deviations would always (or most of the time) imply low 
subjective expectancy, and low deviations would imply high expectancy. To rule out the 
possibility of such confounding effects, we added the between-participants correlation 
analysis. 
4Importantly, we also checked for the mean spider activities during the expectancy 
phase (unaffected by the expectancy modulations). Only the PCu, CUN, and dlPFC clusters 
were characterized by an overall decrease in activity for spiders in spider phobics. The other 
clusters did not show any change in activity (SPL, PCu, CUN; lPFC; left and right PMC, 
SMA), or even showed an overall increase (PCu; SPL, PCu; MOG, MTG). 
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Figure captions 
 
Figure 1. Trial sequence. In each trial, participants saw a picture of a forest location (1 s), 
followed by a picture of an animal (spider, snake, or bird; 4 s). When they saw the animal, 
participants were simultaneously given background information about the number of times 
two forest officials had encountered this animal out of the total number of times they had 
visited the same forest location (e.g., 0/7 and 2/7; displayed below the animal pictures). The 
objective probabilities (= average of the two likelihoods given as background information) 
were equal for all three animals. The participants’ task, then, was to estimate the likelihood 
that they would encounter the same animal if they were at the same location in the forest by 
using a 17-point scale (ranging from 0% [no risk of encounter at all] to 100% [absolute 
certainty of encounter]). They were then asked to provide an estimate of the fear they would 
experience in this scenario on a 17-point scale (scale ranging from 0% [no fear at all] to 
100% [extreme, paralyzing fear]).  
 
Figure 2. Model specification in SPM. Numbers in parentheses refer to the number of events 
modeled per time point/interval. + 3 PM refers to the number of parametric modulators added 
to the model. See fMRI data analysis for details. 
 
Figure 3. Participants’ fear and encounter expectancy ratings. Error bars depict standard 
errors. 
 
Figure 4. Areas displaying group differences upon viewing spiders versus snakes (phobics > 
controls); animal picture presentation phase.  p < .001; k ≥ 30 voxels. 
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Figure 5. Modulation of neural activity as a function of subjective likelihood of encounter 
(contrast modSP < modSN; phobics > controls); expectancy rating phase. p < .005; k ≥ 19 
voxels. CUN = cuneus; dlPFC = dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; lPFC = lateral prefrontal 
cortex; MOG = middle occipital gyrus; MTG = middle temporal gyrus; PCu = precuneus; 
PMC = premotor cortex; SMA = supplementary motor area; SPL = superior parietal lobule. 
 
Figure 6. Modulation of precuneus activity as a function of subjective likelihood of encounter 
(contrast modSP < modSN; phobics > controls); expectancy rating phase. A similar activation 
pattern was observed in the lateral prefrontal cortex, occipital cortex, and right premotor 
cortex/supplementary motor area (see Supplementary Figure 2 for details). 
Table 1 
Areas displaying modulation of activity by subjective likelihood of encounter (contrast modSP 
< modSN; phobics > controls); expectancy rating phase 
        MNI Coordinates 
Region     k t puncorr x y z 
                      
           
SPL, PCu   108 3.96 < .001 6 -61 55 
      3.77 < .001 12 -61 67 
      3.24 < .005 21 -70 55 
SPL, PCu, CUN  136 3.58 < .001 -21 -76 40 
      3.45 < .001 -24 -61 55 
      3.26 < .005 -24 -76 31 
PCu, CUN    27 3.50 < .001 9 -70 25 
      2.94 < .005 0 -82 25 
PCu     23 3.42 < .001 -9 -64 61 
      2.83 < .005 -3 -55 61 
dlPFC   64 3.59 < .001 33 41 22 
lPFC    56 3.76 < .001 -48 35 16 
      3.25 < .005 -39 23 19 
MOG, MTG  70 4.21 < .0001 42 -79 10 
      3.55 < .001 33 -67 25 
      3.25 < .005 30 -79 10 
PMC, SMA  92 3.67 < .001 18 26 37 
   3.64 < .001 18 17 64 
   3.38 < .001 9 17 58 
PMC, SMA  26 3.39 < .001 -15 17 67 
      3.06 < .005 -21 8 70 
                      
 
Note. n = 18 in each group. k = cluster size in number of voxels; MNI Coordinates = Montreal 
Neurological Institute coordinates referring to the maximally activated voxel(s) within each 
cluster (up to 3 per cluster). CUN = cuneus; dlPFC = dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; lPFC = 
lateral prefrontal cortex; MOG = middle occipital gyrus; MTG = middle temporal gyrus; PCu 
= precuneus; PMC = premotor cortex; SMA = supplementary motor area; SPL = superior 
parietal lobule.  
Table 2 
ANOVA results for the modulation of activity as a function of subjective likelihood of encounter (for areas displayed in Table 1 [whole-brain 
analysis], top, and for amygdala [region of interest] bottom); expectancy rating phase. 
 
  Group  Animal Group × Animal 
 
MNI Coordinates 
Region  F(1,33) p F(2,66) p F(2,66) p xmax       ymax zmax 
           
           
Areas identified by contrast  modSP < modSN; phobics > controls; whole-brain analysis    
           
SPL, PCu  1.14 ns 3.07 .05 8.15     < .001  A,B,C,D 6 -61 55 
SPL, PCu, CUN  0.72 ns 1.39   ns 6.89     < .005  A,C -21 -76 40 
PCu, CUN  1.70 ns 1.95   ns 5.53     < .01      A,C,D 9 -70 25 
PCu  1.76 ns 1.06   ns 5.85     < .005  A,C -9 -64 61 
dlPFC  0.89 ns 4.34 < .05 6.24     < .005  A,C,D 33 41 22 
lPFC  0.27 ns 3.10 .05 6.76     < .005  A,E -48 35 16 
MOG, MTG  1.82 ns 1.94   ns 6.21     < .005  A,B,C,D 42 -79 10 
PMC, SMA  1.58 ns 4.90 < .05 8.05     < .001  A,C,D 18 26 37 
PMC, SMA  0.82 ns 3.28 < .05 5.48     < .01    A,D,F -15 17 67 
           
Region of interest analysis    
           
Left amygdala  7.15 < .05 1.52 ns 0.15 ns    
Right amygdala  6.33 < .05 0.98 ns 0.57 ns    
           
 
Note. n = 18 in each group. Bold: p < .05 (two-tailed); italics: p < .10 (two-tailed). MNI Coordinates = Montreal Neurological Institute 
coordinates referring to the maximally activated voxel in the cluster (remember, however, that extracted parameter estimates for 
parametric modulations in each cluster refer to the average effect observed in all of its voxels). ANOVA = analysis of variance; CUN = 
cuneus; dlPFC = dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; lPFC = lateral prefrontal cortex; MOG = middle occipital gyrus; MTG = middle temporal gyrus; 
PCu = precuneus; PMC = premotor cortex; SMA = supplementary motor area; SPL = superior parietal lobule. Letters A to F refer to significance 
levels in post hoc Tukey tests: A = phobic spider vs. phobic snake; B = phobic spider vs. phobic bird; C = phobic spider vs. control spider; D = 
phobic spider vs. control bird; E = phobic snake vs. control snake; F = phobic snake vs. phobic bird. 
 
Table 3 
Correlations between modulation of brain activity by expectancy rating (spider versus snake; 
areas corresponding to Table 1) and magnitude of expectancy bias for spiders over snakes. 
 
     MNI Coordinates 
Region  rPhobics rControls       Z xmax ymax zmax 
        
        
SPL, PCu  -.72 -.20 -1.90 6 -61 55 
SPL, PCu, CUN  -.51  .01 -1.54 -21 -76 40 
PCu, CUN  -.59  .08 -2.04 9 -70 25 
PCu  -.59  .00 -1.82 -9 -64 61 
dlPFC  -.65 -.09 -1.84 33 41 22 
lPFC  -.35 -.24 -0.32 -48 35 16 
MOG, MTG  -.59 -.25 -1.14 42 -79 10 
PMC, SMA  -.43  .17 -1.70 18 26 37 
PMC, SMA  -.26 -.02 -0.66 -15 17 67 
        
 
Note. n = 18 in each group. Bold: p < .05 (two-tailed for r; one-tailed for Z); italics: p < .10 
(two-tailed for r, one-tailed for Z); gray: p ≥ .10 (two-tailed for r; one-tailed for Z). Z = 
Fisher’s Z transformation, testing the difference between the two group correlations (note 
that this Z transformation is depicted for the sake of completeness; because the control 
group did not display any bias, stronger weight was given to the significance of 
correlations within the phobic group rather than to the contrast of the phobic group’s 
correlations with those of the control group); MNI Coordinates = Montreal Neurological 
Institute coordinates referring to the maximally activated voxel in the cluster (remember, 
however, that extracted parameter estimates for parametric modulations in each cluster refer 
to the average effect observed in all of its voxels). CUN = cuneus; dlPFC = dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex; lPFC = lateral prefrontal cortex; MOG = middle occipital gyrus; MTG = 
middle temporal gyrus; PCu = precuneus; PMC = premotor cortex; SMA = supplementary 
motor area; SPL = superior parietal lobule.  
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Supplementary Materials 
 
Figure Captions 
Supplementary Figure 1. Areas displaying group differences upon viewing spiders versus 
birds (phobics > controls); animal picture presentation phase.  p < .001; k ≥ 30 voxels. 
 
Supplementary Figure 2. Modulation of precuneus activity as a function of subjective 
likelihood of encounter (contrast modSP < modSN; phobics > controls), all clusters; expectancy 
rating phase. MNI coordinates refer to the maximally activated voxel in the cluster 
(remember, however, that extracted parameter estimates for parametric modulations in each 
cluster refer to the average effect observed in all of its voxels). CUN = cuneus; dlPFC = 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; lPFC = lateral prefrontal cortex; MOG = middle occipital 
gyrus; MTG = middle temporal gyrus; PCu = precuneus; PMC = premotor cortex; SMA = 
supplementary motor area; SPL = superior parietal lobule. 
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